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Abstract
Background: The use of increasingly complex payment schemes in primary care may represent a barrier to recruiting
general practitioners (GP). The existing Norwegian remuneration system is fully activity based - 2/3 fee-for-service and
1/3 capitation. Given that the system has been designed and revised in close collaborations with the medical
association, it is likely to correspond - at least to some degree - with the preferences of current GPs (men in majority).
The objective of this paper was to study which preferences that young doctors (women in majority), who are the
potential entrants to general practice have for activity based vs. salary based payment systems.
Methods: In November-December 2010 all last year medical students and all interns in Norway (n = 1.562) were
invited to participate in an online survey. The respondents were asked their opinion on systems of remuneration
for GPs; inclination to work as a GP; risk attitude; income preferences; work pace tolerance. The data was analysed
using one-way ANOVA and multinomial logistic regression analysis.
Results: A total of 831 (53%) responded. Nearly half the sample (47%) did not consider the remuneration system
to be important for their inclination to work as GP; 36% considered the current system to make general practice
more attractive, while 17% considered it to make general practice less attractive. Those who are attracted by the
existing system were men and those who think high income is important, while those who are deterred by the
system are risk averse and less happy with a high work pace. On the question of preferred remuneration system,
half the sample preferred a mix of salary and activity based remuneration (the median respondent would prefer a
50/50 mix). Only 20% preferred a fully activity based system like the existing one. A salary system was preferred by
women, and those less concerned with high income, while a fully activity based system was preferred by men,
and those happy with a high work pace.
Conclusions: Given a concern about low recruitment to general practice in Norway, and the fact that an
increasing share of medical students is women, we were interested in the extent to which the current Norwegian
remuneration system correspond with the preferences of potential GPs. This study suggests that an existing
remuneration mechanism has a selection effect on who would like to become a GP. Those most attracted are
income motivated men. Those deterred are risk averse, and less happy with a high work pace. More research is
needed on the extent to which experienced GPs differ along the questions we asked potential GPs, as well as
studying the relative importance of other attributes than payment schemes.
Background
GP remuneration systems are basically of three kinds:
fee-for-service (FFS), capitation, and salary [1]. In prac-
tice, blended payment systems, including at least two of
the three kinds, are widely used. FFS revenues may
come from two different sources - a third party (public
or private) insurer and patients’ out of pocket payments.
Additionally, a public purchaser may pay a lump sum to
cover some of the fixed costs of the practice depending
on national cost variations, as well as bonuses if the GP
achieves some pre-specified targets [2].
Such complex payment mechanisms appear to be a
common feature of many countries’ primary health care
systems [3]. In Norway, the vast majority of GPs work
full time. Few, if any, would do part-time work in hospi-
tals. Apart from a minority of the 7% who are salaried,
Norwegian GPs have private practice and receive
* Correspondence: birgita@norut.no
1National Centre of Rural Medicine, University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Abelsen and Olsen BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:68
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/68
© 2012 Abelsen and Olsen; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.roughly 1/3 based on capitation paid by the municipali-
ties and 2/3 FFS. These standard contracts do not
include any performance elements. Capitation payment
involves a flat rate per patient on the list. The FFS part
is a mix of a fixed fee paid by patients, and variable fees
paid by the federal government, depending on the dura-
tion of the consultation, on whether certain types of
examinations and laboratory tests are initiated, and on
whether or not the GP is a specialist in general medi-
cine [4]. These intricate activity based payment con-
tracts stand in sharp contrast to the salary based
payments of doctors in hospitals and other parts of the
health sector.
There are currently 5,000 GPs in Norway as compared
to approximately 11,500 hospital doctors [5]. The aver-
age annual gross income of hospital doctors was NOK
770,000 (1€ = 7.75 NOK) in 2008 [6]. The comparable
income of GPs is not easily accessible. However, infor-
mation obtained from the Norwegian Medical Associa-
tion refers to an average net profit (gross income)
among self-employed GPs of NOK 1,030,000 in 2009.
Even if this figure is not directly comparable due to
their expenses for pension and sickness insurance, there
is little doubt that GPs earn more than hospital doctors
and that this is common knowledge among young
entrants to the medical profession in Norway. There is
no educational requirement beyond their internship to
practice as a GP. However, 53.4% of GPs are specialists
[5], which normally would take 6 years after internship
to become.
Clearly, activity based systems may have behavioural
effects on GPs’ practice profiles: capitation rewards
having many patients on the list, and FFS rewards con-
sultations with many tests and prescriptions [7]. This
is not surprising to economists, but still controversial
among health care workers and politicians [8]. The-
ories of economic incentives are largely based on a
hypothesis of self-interest, while theories on public ser-
vice motivation and intra-occupational norms - includ-
ing medical ethics - would predict more altruistic
preferences among GPs.
Payment systems have selection effects: activity based
systems attract more able workers and people who are
relatively more income motivated and risk tolerant
[9-11]. While an existing remuneration system might
correspond with the preferences of current GPs who
may have been attracted by it, or have adapted and
learned to benefit from it, the system does not necessa-
rily correspond with the preferences of the majority of
young doctors who are the potential entrants to general
practice. The aim of this paper is to explore i) the extent
to which the current activity based remuneration system
affect young Norwegian doctors’ inclination to choose
general practice as their career path, and ii) which
remuneration system they would prefer if they were to
work as GPs.
Fee-for-service can be traced back to a time when GPs
were independent private practitioners, a role in which
they may still perceive themselves despite the fact that
the main bulk of their revenues now stem from the pub-
lic purse. This paper is not concerned about the good-
ness of this system in terms of efficiency and equity
considerations, but rather the extents to which it may
affect recruitment of GPs.
The most recent health reform in Norway states a
need for a large increase in the number of GPs [12]. In
2010 the share of women among GPs was 35.5%, while
it was 61% among last year medical students [13]. The
influx of women in the medical profession signals a
pending gender shift in the future GP workforce. Given
the fact that women are less attracted by performance
related pay than are men [10], an activity based remu-
neration system might represent an impediment to GP
recruitment. t is hypothesized that respondents’ views
on GP payment systems would reflect gender differences
and underlying differences in personality traits in terms
of risk attitude, income motivation, and preferred work
pace. We would also assume that the sub-group who
has experienced general practice as interns would differ
from those who have no prior GP experience.
Methods
A cross-sectional study was conducted in November -
December 2010 among all last year medical students
and all interns in Norway (n = 1,562). Medical training
in universities in Norway is followed by 18 months’
compulsory preliminary internship; 12 months in hospi-
tals and 6 months in general practice. Contact informa-
tion was provided by the four Norwegian medical
faculties and the organisers of internship (local health
authorities and county governor offices). The informa-
tion letter included a web link to an online question-
naire. Two reminders were mailed. The survey was
reported to the Privacy Ombudsman for Research in
Norway in accordance with notification requirements.
The questionnaire design process was preceded by a
qualitative study whereby five medical students and
three interns had been interviewed about their prefer-
ences for various job characteristics. The interviews
were recorded and transcribed, and the data analysis
revealed different aspects and understandings concern-
ing views on remuneration and income, providing us
with some highly relevant background when formulating
the survey questions.
The first question sought to reveal respondents’ incli-
nation to work as a GP: ‘Which job would you wish to
have in 10-15 years?’ GP was listed among six alterna-
tives to which multi-opted answering was possible.
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based nature of the current Norwegian system, they
were then asked: ‘Do you consider this remuneration
system to have any effect on your inclination to work as
a GP?’ Three alternative answers were listed: 1) it makes
it more attractive; 2) less attractive, and 3) it is not
important. Thereafter, they were asked ‘If you were to
work as a GP, which remuneration system would you
prefer if you could choose?’ The optional answers were:
1) salary; 2) activity based (the present system); 3) mix
of salary and activity based (including an open space to
fill in preferred salary percentage), and; 4) don’tk n o w .
Answers to these two questions are sought explained by
differences in respondent characteristics such as gender,
personality traits regarding risk attitude, the importance
of high income, preferred work pace, as well as their
GP-experience and their inclination to work as a GP
(see Table 1).
The importance of a high income, and work pace tol-
erance, were measured using statements (see Table 1)
with which respondents were asked to state their level
of agreement on a six-point ordinal scale ranging from
strong disagreement to strong agreement.
Risk attitude was measured by six items (see Table 2)
from the Jackson Personality Inventory-Revised [14],
adapted and validated by Pearson et al [15]. These items
have been used in several studies of medical decision
making [16-20]. The respondent scored all items on a
Likert scale (1-6). These scores were added to an index
ranging from 6 (very risk averse) to 36 (very risk seek-
ing). Respondents who scored lower than 1 standard
deviation (SD) below the mean were classified as risk
averse, those who scored 1 SD above the mean were
classified as risk seeking, while those who scored in the
range mean ± 1 SD were classified as risk neutral.
The data was initially analysed by frequency counts,
means, medians and T-tests. One-way ANOVA was
used to test for differences in respondent characteristics
among the groups giving different answers to the two
main questions analysed (see Tables 3 and 4). Multino-
mial logistic regression analysis [21,22] was then used to
create profiles of respondents who considered the GP
remuneration to be 1) positive and make general prac-
tice more attractive, or 2) negative and make general
practice less attractive (see Table 5). The same type of
analysis was used to create profiles of respondents who
preferred 1) salary, or 2) activity based remuneration, if
they were to work as GPs and was free to choose remu-
neration system. The independent variables were all
included as dummies. SPSS version 17.0 was used to
perform the statistical analyses.
Results
A total of 831 persons (53%) responded. The response
rate differed across sub-groups: from 47% among hospi-
tal interns; 54% among last year medical students, and;
60% among GP interns. The gender balance among the
respondents was identical to that in the sample invited
to participate. The respondents differed in age between
23 and 53 years old. The mean and the median age was
28, and 83% were 30 years or younger. We do not know
of any selection bias in terms of age. However, when we
included age in the type of multinomial regression ana-
lyses reported in Tables 5 and 6, it had no significant
effect. Country of graduation was asked for, but we do
not know if there is any selection bias. However, as a
Table 1 Respondent characteristics, n = 831
Variable Value n Percent
Sex Male 340 41
Female 490 59
Experience Last year medical student 256 31
Intern in hospital 284 35
Intern in GP practice 291 34
Inclined to work as GP Yes 437 53
No 394 47
Risk attitude (index range: 6-32) Risk averse (index < 12) 139 17
Risk neutral (index [12-22]) 540 65
Risk seeking (index > 22) 144 18
“It is important for me to have a high income” Do not agree (index 1-2) 67 8
Some agreement (index 3-4) 421 51
Strong agreement (index 5-6) 340 41
“I am happy with a high work pace” Do not agree (index 1-2) 80 10
Some agreement (index 3-4) 431 52
Strong agreement (index 5-6) 317 38
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nificantly different from those trained in Norway. There
were small differences in response rates among medical
students between the four universities, in the range 48%
and 57%. We tested for the possible existence of any
clustering effect, or different norms, across the four
sites, but we did not find any significant differences.
Table 1 shows respondents characteristics as well as
their distributions of preferences concerning income,
work pace and risk. Note the strong majority of women
among young Norwegian physicians (59%). While 53%
in the total sample were inclined to work as a GP, there
was a significant difference in the sub-group of students
(61%) vs. in the sub-group of interns with a GP-experi-
ence (44%), i.e. it seems that after experiencing what it
is like to work as GP, a large proportion is deterred by
this career path. However, the number 53% would
grossly overestimate their inclination to end up as GPs.
As multioptional answers were possible for the six listed
alternatives, the average number of options ticked was
2. Only 13% had ticked GP career only.
Some 40% stated strong agreement that high income
is important, the same as for being happy with a high
work pace. The correlation between the two was statisti-
cally significant though quite weak (Spearman’sr=
0.157, p < 0.01). The distribution of responses to the
risk attitude statements is given in Table 2. The mean
risk attitude index was 17 and the standard deviation 5.
The mean risk attitude index differed significantly
between men and women (19 vs. 16, p < 0.001)
Does the current GP remuneration system affect
recruitment?
Nearly half the sample did not think that the current
system have any influence on their inclination to work
as a GP. Among those who considered it to have an
impact, twice as many were attracted than deterred (see
Table 3). Not surprisingly, thec h a r a c t e r i s t i c so ft h o s e
who thought the current activity based system has a
positive effect on their inclination to work as a GP, dif-
fered from those who thought the system has a negative
effect. Table 5 proves this point. Those who think that
the current remuneration system makes it more attrac-
tive to work as a GP are to greater extent men and
those who think it is important to have a high income.
Conversely, those who think that the current system
makes general practice less attractive are risk averse, and
those not happy with a high work pace. Interestingly,
interns who have worked in general practice appear to
have got a more conscious view on the effect of the
remuneration system for their inclination to become a
GP (see Table 3). They either like the current remunera-
tion system or they dislike it. However, the degree of
disapproval is much stronger than the degree of
Table 2 Distribution of responses to the risk attitude statements (Percent)
Strongly disagree
1
2345 Stongly agree
6
n
a. I enjoy taking risks 15.7 30.6 22.8 21.8 7.8 1.2 829
b. I try to avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes* 3.4 17.5 26.8 23.6 21.5 7.2 828
c. Taking risks does not bother me if gains involved are high 9.0 26.1 30.4 23.0 9.5 1.9 829
d. I consider security an important element in every aspect of my life* 0.8 5.2 12.0 26.3 36.1 19.4 825
e. People have told me that I seem to enjoy taking chances 26.6 31.0 21.7 12.5 6.7 1.5 822
f. I rarely, if ever, take risks when there is another alternative* 4.2 14.8 29.3 22.4 17.5 11.8 830
* In the construction of the risk attitude index, statement b, d and f were reversely recorded.
Table 3 The existing remuneration system’s influence on inclination to work as GP
“Do you consider the GP remuneration
system to have any effect on your
inclination to work as a GP?”
Not important Positive effect Negative effect n
47% 36% 17% 829
One-way ANOVA analyses: Means P - value
Sex (1 = male) 0.30 0.58 0.34 827 < 0.001
Risk attitude index (6-32) 17.12 18.25 16.65 814 0.003
High income important (1-6) 3.85 4.71 4.08 826 < 0.001
Feel happy with a high work pace (1-6) 4.05 4.37 3.76 826 < 0.001
GP experience (1 = Yes) 0.27 0.36 0.49 828 < 0.001
Inclined to work as GP (1 = Yes) 0.53 0.58 0.41 829 0.007
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has a positive effect on those who had said they were
inclined to work as a GP.
Which remuneration system is preferred?
About half the sample preferred a mix of salary and
activity based remuneration if they were free to choose
(see Table 4). Those who opted for such a blended sys-
tem were asked to state which percentage should be a
fixed salary. The preferred percentage ranged between
25 and 80%, the mean was 57.6% and the median 50%.
The relative support for salary only and for activity
based only was the same, 20% for each. In other words,
among potential entrants to general practice, only one
in five prefer the current remuneration system. Table 6
shows that those who prefer this system are to greater
extents men, and those who feel happy with a high
work pace. Conversely, those who prefer a salary based
system are to greater extents women, and those who do
not think high income is important.
When comparing how much of the variations are
explained in Table 5 vs. Table 6 the higher pseudo R
2
measures in Table 5 may reflect a more conscious
response to the question on whether the existing
Table 4 Preferred GP remuneration system
“Which remuneration system would you prefer if you were to work as a GP and had a free
choice?”
Salary Mix of salary and activity based Activity based I do not know n
20% 48% 20% 12% 829
One-way ANOVA analyses: Means p-value
Sex (1 = male) 0.28 0.43 0.58 729 < 0.001
Risk attitude index (6-32) 16.15 17.71 18.43 713 < 0.001
High income important (1-6) 3.92 4.25 4.60 726 < 0.001
Feel happy with a high work pace (1-6) 3.80 4.13 4.52 727 < 0.001
GP experience
(1 = Yes)
0.39 0.33 0.38 729 0.291
Inclined to work as GP (1 = yes) 0.46 0.53 0.58 729 0.084
Total response and response analyzed by single independent variables
Table 5 Multinomial logistic regression analysis of the existing GP remuneration system’s influence on the
respondents’ inclination to work as GP
Independent variables Positive effect
Odds Ratio (95%CI)
n = 293
Negative effect
Odds Ratio (95%CI)
n = 135
Sex
0 = Female, 1 = Male 2.79 (1.97-3.94)*** 1.11 (0.71-1.74)
Risk attitude
Neutral 11
Risk averse 1.06 (0.65-1.74) 1.74 (1.05-2.89)*
Risk seeking 1.38 (0.88-2.16) 1.47 (0.82-2.66)
Important to have a high income
Do not agree 11
Some agreement 4.27 (1.62-11.24)** 1.27 (0.63-2.54)
Strong agreement 13.33 (5.00-35.71)*** 1.97 (0.95-4.10)
Feel happy with a high work pace
Do not agree 11
Some agreement 1.29 (0.66-2.53) 0.50 (0.27-0.93)*
Strong agreement 1.97 (0.98-3.97) 0.43 (0.22-0.84)*
Experience
0 = Student or hospital intern, 1 = Yes (GP intern) 1.76 (1.19-2.46)** 2.61 (1.72-3.97)***
Inclined to work as GP
0 = No, 1 = Yes 1.56 (1.10-2.21)** 0.68 (0.45-1.04)
Cox & Snell R
2 0.212
Nagelkerke R
2 0.244
The reference category is: Remuneration system is not important (n = 385). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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their inclination to work as a GP, while the subsequent
question on which remuneration system they would pre-
fer (Table 6) may be perceived as a more hypothetical
choice. A related explanation can be found by noting
that having experience as GP-intern came out strongly
significant in Table 5 but not in Table 6.
Discussion
It is widely believed that professionals hold high stan-
dards in how they should perform, and that financial
incentives are important, but not sufficient to determine
their behaviors [23]. It was therefore expected that
young potential GPs are driven by a complex mix of
financial and non-financial motives in their choice of
career path. Nearly half the sample did not think that
the existing activity based remuneration system had an
effect on their inclination to work as a GP. However,
given that this group had scored significantly lower on
the statement ‘High income is important to me’,t h e y
may generally be less interested in how GPs happen to
be paid.
The existing system did have a positive effect on those
who think that high income is important and on men.
Conversely, the system has a deterrent effect on risk
averse people and those who are not happy with a high
work pace. This finding that risk averse people are
deterred by activity based remuneration is consistent
with what theory would predict. The principal-agent
theory focuses on both risks and rewards [24], and
emphasizes that risk averse people dislike income risk
associated with variable pay when output depends upon
factors beyond their control [10,24].
Only one in five young doctors would prefer a fully
activity based remuneration system. There are signifi-
cantly more men in the group preferring an activity
based system, while there are significantly more women
preferring full salary. The gender difference may be
linked to differences in values that lead women to select
work settings that best facilitate a work-family balance
[25]. Accordingly, young female doctors may perceive
salary a better choice in a situation where they are more
likely to work part time than men primarily in order to
better balance work and family [26]. However, the desire
for flexibility and a more manageable workload because
of greater family responsibilities is preferred by young
male doctors as well. The gender difference might also
be driven in part by gender differences in risk attitude.
The entrepreneurial position as self-employed which
comes with the activity based remuneration system is
known in general not to attract risk averse individuals
[27,28]. As expected, a salary system was preferred by
Table 6 Multinomial logistic regression analysis of preferred GP remuneration system
Independent variables Salary Odds Ratio (95%CI)
n = 163
Activity based
Odds Ratio (95%CI)
n = 160
Sex
0 = Female, 1 = Male 0.59 (0.39-0.89)** 1.69 (1.15-2.49)**
Risk attitude
Neutral 11
Risk averse 1.32 (0.82-2.12) 1.07 (0.60-1.89)
Risk seeking 0.94 (0.54-1.62) 1.00 (0.66-1.72)
Important to have a high income
Do not agree 11
Some agreement 0.51 (0.27-0.95)* 0.94 (0.38-2.32)
Strong agreement 0.45 (0.23-0.85)* 1.65 (0.67-4.03)
Feel happy with a high work pace
Do not agree 11
Some agreement 0.79 (0.44-1.43) 2.24 (0.89-5.65)
Strong agreement 0.57 (0.30-1.10) 3.94 (1.54-10.10)**
Experience
0 = Student or hospital intern, 1 = Yes (GP intern) 1.29 (0.87-1.90) 1.31 (0.88-1.95)
Inclined to work as GP
0 = No, 1 = Yes 0.72 (0.49-1.05) 1.50 (1.01-2.23)*
Cox & Snell R
2 0.110
Nagelkerke R
2 0.128
The reference category is: Mix of salary and activity based remuneration (n = 390).
Those who answered “I don’t know” (n = 100) are excluded from the analysis.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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while activity based remuneration was preferred by
those who are happy with a high work pace. In theory
the probability of preferring activity based remuneration
i sh i g h e rt h em o r ep r o d u c t i v eaw o r k e ri s[ 1 0 ] ,a n d
being happy with a high work pace might indicate a
productive and more able worker.
The effect of having stated that general practice would
be a preferred career path revealed some interesting
indications: Given that one has at least some knowledge
about the payment system involved in this career, one
should not be surprised that approving this system
makes one inclined to become a GP. On the other
hand, while not significant, there is indication that the
reverse is also true for one subgroup, suggesting that
the existing system has a negative effect on some of
those who were inclined to become GP.
These findings indicate that the choice of payment
scheme has some selection effects on which personality
traits are attracted and which are deterred. The current
activity based scheme attracts people who think high
income is important, which suggests that this group per-
ceive general practice to be potentially more lucrative
than other career paths. Income motivated GPs are
likely to let their clinical practice be more influenced by
own financial motives than are those who do not think
high income is so important. Hence, a higher service
provision under FFS may not only reflect an incentive
effect but a selection effect as well, in that the system
attracts a sub-group of doctors who are relatively more
income focused and therefore more responsive to finan-
cial incentives (see also [10,11]). This could be seen as a
problem reasoned in increased risk of physician-induced
demand [7]. In a totally different perspective, more
focus and promotion of the business elements of general
practice, represented by features like the activity based
remuneration system and self-employment, might be a
way of attracting more men to medical education to
dam the influx of women.
In the choice of payment schemes it was not explicitly
stated which expected income levels, or income ranges,
that would be associated with the payment schemes.
However, we believe our respondents would have a
fairly good idea of the income levels among GPs vs. sal-
aried hospital physicians, and would implicitly acknowl-
edge that the potential income range is higher under an
activity based remuneration system. Clearly, preferences
m a yc h a n g eo v e rt i m e .I n c o m em a yb el e s si m p o r t a n t
when you are a student, but more important when you
start to build a family. Follow-up surveys on these
respondents are therefore of much interest. Certainly,
there are important job attributes beyond payment
schemes that determine the choice of becoming a GP.
Their relative importance is a research topic in its own,
and several studies are currently undertaken, e.g. in
Denmark [29] and Australia [30].
We have suggested the existence of a possible selec-
tion effect. It might well be that an existing system cor-
responds with the preferences of experienced insiders,
but ‘The times they are a-changin’ and women have dif-
ferent pay scheme preferences [10]. The current study
provides new insights into the ways in which different
personality traits among young doctors affect their pre-
ferences for GP payment systems. Certainly, further stu-
dies are required, particularly one that would compare
the preferences of potential entrants to general practice
with the preferences of older experienced GPs.
Conclusions
Given a concern about low recruitment to general prac-
tice in Norway, and the fact that an increasing share of
medical students is women, we were interested in the
extent to which the current Norwegian remuneration
system correspond with the preferences of potential
GPs. Only 20% of young doctors would prefer the cur-
rent remuneration system if they were to work as a GP.
This study suggests that an existing remuneration
mechanism has a selection effect on who would like to
become a GP. Those most attracted are income moti-
vated men. Those deterred are risk averse, and less
happy with a high work pace. Concerns about low
recruitment to GP practice call for further research on
how these preferences translate into actual choices.
Further research is also needed on the extent to which
experienced GPs differ along the questions we asked
potential GPs, as well as studies on the relative impor-
tance of other attributes than payment schemes.
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